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Abstract
We prove that a social choice function is repeatedly implementable if
and only if it is dynamically monotonic when the number of agents is
at least three. We show how to test dynamic monotonicity by building
an associated repeated game. It follows that a weaker version of Maskin
monotonicity is necessary and sufficient among the social choice functions
that are efficient. As an application, we show that utilitarian social choice
functions, which can only be one-shot implemented with side-payments,
are repeatedly implementable, as continuation payoffs can play the role of
transfers. Under some additional assumptions, our results also apply when
the number of agents is two.
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We consider an infinite horizon problem when a new state of the world is realised
in each period (i.i.d.). A social designer wants to select an outcome in each
period, which depends on that period’s state. However, the realised state is only
observed by agents, and never by the designer. Therefore, the designer must
construct a sequence of mechanisms, referred to as a regime, that would allow to
elicit the state of the world from the agents in each period and, at the same time,
implement the desired outcome.
Our objective is to characterise the social choice functions that are repeatedly
implementable in Nash equilibrium. A social choice function – a mapping from
states of the world into the set of alternatives – is repeatedly implementable if
there exists a regime such that the set of Nash equilibria of the game, which is
induced by this regime, is non-empty and, for any sequence of realized states, the
sequence of outcomes in any Nash equilibrium is such that in each period, the
outcome coincides with the socially desired one (i.e., we consider full outcome im-
plementation). With the help of our characterization, we provide practical ways
to check if a social choice function is repeatedly implementable. In particular,
as an application, we prove that utilitarian social choice functions are repeatedly
implementable by showing that continuation payoff promises can effectively play
the role of side-payments, which are needed for implementation in static setups.
The same problem has recently been studied by Lee and Sabourian (2011)
and Mezzetti and Renou (2014) with n agents.1 Lee and Sabourian (2011) show
in their Theorem 1 that if a social choice function is not weakly efficient in its
range, then the function is not repeatedly implementable for sufficiently high
discount factors. They also show in their Theorem 2 that for n > 2, strict
efficiency in the range together with certain domain restrictions are sufficient for
outcome implementation from period 2 onwards. In turn, Mezzetti and Renou
(2014) introduce a condition, called dynamic monotonicity (DM), and show in
their Theorem 1 that it is necessary, while in their Theorem 2, they show that
for n > 2, dynamic monotonicity plus no-veto power are sufficient for repeated
implementation both in finite and infinite horizon problems, irrespective of the
magnitude of the discount factor. Both Lee and Sabourian (2011) and Mezzetti
and Renou (2014) offer additional sufficient conditions to treat the case of n = 2
in their Theorem 3.
We contribute to this literature by closing the gap between necessary and
sufficient conditions when n > 2. We also strengthen the results of both Theorem
3 in Lee and Sabourian (2011) and that in Mezzetti and Renou (2014) in the case
of n = 2. In the following, we discuss our results in more detail starting with the
1Repeated implementation has also been studied by Kalai and Ledyard (1998) and Chambers
(2004), but their setup is different: the socially desired outcome is allowed to change over time
and according to the state the world but the latter is drawn only once and kept fixed for all
periods.
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case of n > 2.
The Case of n > 2:
First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a function to be repeat-
edly implementable. Our Theorem 1 states that if the designer can only use
regimes with deterministic stage mechanisms but possibly stochastic transitions,
then a function is repeatedly implementable if and only if there exists a collec-
tion of sets C with respect to which this function is dynamically monotonic (in
the sense of Mezzetti and Renou (2014)) and relative to the same collection C,
the function satisfies two further conditions, which we call λ0 and λ1. Conse-
quently, we improve on Theorem 2 of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) by replacing
their non-necessary assumption of no-veto power with necessary Conditions λ0
and λ1.
To understand the role of the necessary and sufficient conditions, consider
Condition µ of Moore and Repullo (1990), which is necessary and sufficient for
implementation in a static setup. Dynamic monotonicity w.r.t. C can be thought
as a dynamic version of µ(i), i.e., Maskin monotonicity, while Conditions λ0 and
λ1 can be thought as dynamic versions of µ(ii) combined with µ(iii). Further,
similar to Condition µ, the collection of sets C plays the role of lower contour
sets and describes the outcomes that each agent can demand when deviating
unilaterally from equilibrium strategies. These sets are chosen so as to give the
incentives to agents to upset undesirable equilibria without introducing other
undesirable equilibria. Specifically, dynamic monotonicity w.r.t. C ensures that
there exists an agent who has incentives to deviate if a joint lie by agents, which we
call a deception, about the true state of the world leads to an undesirable outcome
in some period. On the other hand, Conditions λ0 and λ1 ensure that such a
deviation by a single agent does not result in another undesirable equilibrium.
Second, we show that even simpler characterization of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions is possible if the designer has more flexibility in the choice of
mechanisms. Thus, Corollary 1, which we consider to be our main result, states
that if the designer, in addition to stochastic transitions, can also use stochastic
stage mechanisms, then a function is repeatedly implementable if and only if it
is dynamically monotonic with respect to a collection of sets C.2 To show this
result, we build an auxiliary repeated game with random states and connect the
properties of its equilibrium payoff set to DM. It turns out that a function is
DM w.r.t. some C if and only if it is Maskin monotonic* (a weaker version of
Maskin monotonicity, which we explain later) and the payoffs, when the function
is implemented, are the unique efficient equilibrium payoffs of the repeated game
(see Lemma 2). Then, by using recent results on the upper-semicontinuity of
2Mezzetti and Renou (2014) only allow for stochastic transitions and deterministic stage
mechanisms. In a static setup, random mechanisms have been employed in Abreu and Sen
(1991); Bochet (2007); Benôıt and Ok (2008); Lombardi (2012).
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the equilibrium payoff correspondence of repeated games (Plan, 2014), we show
that C can always be modified so as Conditions λ0 and λ1 hold vacuously while
preserving DM at the same time. The repeated game also turns out to be useful
for another reason as we discuss next.
Third, checking dynamic monotonicity can be challenging in practice. How-
ever, we argue that it can be numerically verified or disproved by using the
repeated game that we have constructed for the proof of Corollary 1. The nu-
merical methods offered by Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) can approximate
the equilibrium payoff set of this repeated game, once we allow for public ran-
domization. As mentioned before, the properties of the equilibrium payoff set
then tell us about DM of the corresponding social choice function. Of course,
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 still hold, when agents have access to a public ran-
domization device with the qualification that DM must now be satisfied for all,
possibly random, deceptions. Additionally, by applying a recent result of Abreu
and Sannikov (2014), we argue that when the number of agents is two and they
have access to a public randomization device, only Markovian deceptions must
be checked, i.e., those deceptions that, besides the current state, only depend on
the previous period’s state and on the realization of the previous period’s public
randomization. However, this result does not extend to the case with more than
two agents.
Fourth, we also improve on Theorem 2 of Lee and Sabourian (2011) and show
that Maskin monotonicity* makes the domain restrictions of Lee and Sabourian
(2011) unnecessary, as long as the social choice function is efficient in the range.
We state in Proposition 2 that if a function is efficient in its range and Maskin
monotonic*, then it is DM. Hence, by Corollary 1, it is repeatedly implementable.3
Maskin monotonicity* is a simple necessary condition, which is implied by both
Maskin monotonicity and DM. Said simply, it rules out deceptions in which agents
jointly lie about the state of the world only in a certain period and from the next
period on they report honestly. Interestingly, it is also connected to one-shot
implementation with side-payments as we discuss next.
Fifth, as an application of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, we show that (gen-
eralized) utilitarian social choice functions are repeatedly implementable in an
environment that is adapted from Laffont and Maskin (1982). We say that a
function is a utilitarian social choice function if in each state it maximizes some
weighted sum of agents’ utilities, assuming that these weights are the same across
the states. A utilitarian social choice function is obviously efficient in its range.
We also show that it is Maskin monotonic* in Proposition 3. On the other hand,
it follows from Laffont and Maskin (1982) that a social choice rule consisting of
a utilitarian social choice function and a private transfer function is one-shot im-
plementable, when agents have quasi-linear preferences. Therefore, one can say
3Note, however, that Lee and Sabourian (2011) work with fully deterministic regimes, while
we allow for stochastic transitions and stochastic stage mechanisms.
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that side-payments, which often facilitate implementation in static setups, can
be redundant in repeated setups as their role is effectively played by continuation
payoff promises.
The Case of n = 2:
Our results also extend to the case with two agents under some additional as-
sumptions. Any necessary and sufficient conditions for the two agent case must
include the necessary and sufficient conditions for the case of more than two
agents. However, when n = 2, the designer must additionally face the prob-
lem that the agents are sending different messages about the state of the world
and the “deviator” cannot be identified. To overcome this problem, we need to
introduce additional conditions.
First, in Proposition 4, we establish a result similar to the one in Proposition
2 for n = 2. Besides Maskin monotonicity* and efficiency (not just efficiency in
the range) of social choice function, we also assume that the function satisfies a
version of (static) self-selection condition. The self-selection condition is neces-
sary for the static implementation as shown by Moore and Repullo (1990) and
Dutta and Sen (1991). It is also used by Lee and Sabourian (2011) in their The-
orem 3, which states that efficiency in the range, self-selection, and their usual
domain restrictions are sufficient for repeated implementation of social choice
function when n = 2. However, we argue in Section 7 that either self-selection or
efficiency in the range must be strengthened to obtain repeated implementation.
Therefore, we assume efficiency in Proposition 4. Alternatively, we could assume
efficiency in the range but then self-selection must be replaced with self-selection
in the range.
Second, we show in Proposition 5 that the result of Corollary 1 carries over
to the n = 2 case if we assume that there exists a bad outcome (for its use, see,
e.g., Moore and Repullo (1990) or Mezzetti and Renou (2014)). Now, whenever
the agents send different messages and the deviator cannot be identified, the
designer can simply implement the bad outcome forever. This is sufficient to rule
out contradictory messages in the equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
model and basic notation. In Section 3, we provide the definitions of Maskin
monotonicity* and dynamic monotonicity. We also derive Conditions λ0 and λ1
and state Theorem 1 in this section. In Section 4, we prove Corollary 1. To do
it, in Section 4.1, we introduce an auxiliary repeated game with random states,
which is derived from the repeated implementation environment, and in Section
4.2, we prove several lemmas that connect DM with the equilibrium payoff set
of the associated repeated game (for any n ≥ 2). In Section 5, we discuss how
one can numerically test DM using the results of Section 4.2. In Section 6, we
first relate our findings to Lee and Sabourian (2011) and show that efficiency
in the range and the necessary condition of Maskin monotonicity* are sufficient
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for implementation when n > 2. As an application of this result, we next prove
that the utilitarian social choice functions are repeatedly implementable in the
environment of Laffont and Maskin (1982). In Section 7, we present and discuss
our results for the n = 2 case. The proof of the sufficiency part of Theorem 1
can be found in Section A in Appendix. The proofs of the propositions for the
n = 2 case are also relegated to Appendix and can be found in Section B. Finally,
we illustrate and compare our results to those in the literature through several
examples in Section C, which hopefully also make the reading of the paper easier.
2 The Model
2.1 Preferences
There is a finite set of agents, I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, a finite set of alternatives, A, a
finite set of states of the world, Θ, and an infinity of periods, T = {0, 1, 2, . . .}.4
Each period t ∈ T , a state of the world θ ∈ Θ is independently and identically
realized with probability p(θ). We assume that p(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. Let
ã ∈ ∆A denote a random alternative and let ã(a) denote the probability that
the deterministic alternative a ∈ A is selected. When we want to emphasize that
the selected alternative depends on the state, we will write accordingly ã(θ) and
ã(θ)(a). Throughout, we will use superscripts for variables to indicate a time
period and subscripts to indicate an agent.
The preferences of the agents are represented by the discounting criterion.
Given a sequence of random alternatives, (ãτ (θ))τ∈T,θ∈Θ, the period t (continua-
tion) payoff of agent i before he has learnt the state of the world of that period,
is given by








Let vt = (vt1, . . . , v
t
n) be a payoff profile in period t, and let V denote the set of
feasible payoff profiles. Note that the set V is the same for all t. We will write
ui(ã, θ) for
∑
a∈A ã(a)ui(a, θ). Once agent i learns that the state of the world in
period t is θ, his period t payoff is (1 − δ)ui(ãt, θ) + δvt+1i if random alternative
ãt is selected in that period and the continuation payoff is vt+1i .
Agent i’s preferences over A × V in any state θ are completely described
by Ui(a, v, θ) = (1 − δ)ui(a, θ) + δvi. We assume that Ui(·, ·, θ) is a Bernoulli
utility function for all i, determining the preferences over ∆(A× V ) as expected
utilities. Throughout, we assume that in each state, agents have strict preferences
4We keep finiteness of A for simplicity. All proofs can be modified to accommodate infinite
A as well. In fact, in Section 6.1, we provide an application of our results, where A = [0, 1]. The
finiteness of Θ can be relaxed for Theorem 1, but it is necessary for Corollary 1 and Propositions
4 and 5.
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over the set of non-random alternatives, i.e., ui(a, θ) ̸= ui(b, θ) for all i, θ, a ∈ A,
and b ∈ A. We will discuss in the text how our results can be extended to the
case of weak preferences.
2.1.1 “Preferences” of the Designer
A social choice function5 maps states of the world into alternatives, f : Θ → A.
The objective of the designer is to select alternative f(θt) in period t if the state
of that period is θt. However, the designer never observes the realized state of the
world, while all agents observe θt at the beginning of period t. Note that we are




Let Γ be a set of mechanisms or game forms. A deterministic mechanism γ ∈ Γ
is a pair ((Mi)i∈I , g) where Mi denotes a message space of agent i, and g :
×i∈IMi → A is a deterministic allocation rule. Let M = ×i∈IMi be the space
of message profiles. Let mi and m = (m1, . . . ,mn) be generic elements of Mi and
M. If g : ×i∈IMi → ∆A, we say that the mechanism is stochastic and g(m)(a)
denotes the probability of selecting alternative a.
2.2.2 Histories
The designer chooses, possibly randomly, the current period’s mechanism which
he commits to. A state of the world is realized. All agents are informed about
the state and the selected mechanism. That is, even if the mechanism was chosen
randomly, the agents are informed about the realized mechanism. The agents
send public, simultaneous messages to the designer. The designer implements
the (possibly random) alternative, which he has committed to. Then the process
is repeated in the next period and so on.
Let period 0 history be h0 = ∅. The history that is observed by all agents
in the beginning of period t > 0 is ht = (θ0, γ0,m0, a0, . . . , θt−1, γt−1,mt−1, at−1)
where θτ ∈ Θ, γτ ∈ Γ, mτ ∈ Mt, where Mτ is the space of message profiles
corresponding to mechanism γτ , and aτ ∈ A is the realization of gτ (mτ ), where gτ
is the possibly stochastic allocation rule corresponding to γτ . Hence, the period t
history does not contain the period t state of the world and the mechanism, which
will be used by the designer in that period. Let H t be the space of all possible
period t histories that are observed by the agents, with H0 = {∅}. The space
5The case of social choice correspondences can be tackled as in Lee and Sabourian (2011)
and Mezzetti and Renou (2014).
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of all possible agents’ histories is H = ∪∞t=0H t. The designer cannot distinguish
between any two period t histories that only differ in the realized states of the
world.
2.2.3 Regimes
A dynamic mechanism regime or regime for short is a transition rule r : H →
∆(Γ), where r(γ|ht) denotes the probability that mechanism γ is selected after
history ht. We say that a regime is simply-stochastic if the stage mechanisms
must be deterministic, i.e., for any γ ∈ Γ, the corresponding g maps M to A.
If γ can be stochastic, i.e., when g maps M to ∆A, we say that the regime is
doubly-stochastic. Note that r(γ|ht) = r(γ|h̃t) if the designer cannot distinguish
between histories ht and h̃t.
2.2.4 Strategies and Payoffs
Fix a regime r. In period t, after the state θt is realized, the agents learn the
state θt and the mechanism γt, which will be used in period t by the designer.
The randomness of r(γ|ht) is resolved before agents send their messages. Hence,
a pure6 strategy, si of agent i selects a message si(h
t, θt, γt) ∈ Mti for each t ∈ T
and each (ht, θt, γt) ∈ H t ×Θ× Γ. Let s = (s1, . . . , sn) be a profile of messages.
The strategy profile s and the regime r together with the distribution of
states of the world p induce a distribution over histories. Let q(ht|s, r) denote
the probability that history ht is realized given s and r. Define q(h0|s, r) =
1. Given q(ht|s, r), q((ht, θt, γt,mt, at)|s, r) = q(ht|s, r)p(θt)r(γt|ht)gt(mt)(at) if
s(ht, θt, γt) = mt and q((ht, θt, γt,mt)|s, r) = 0 otherwise. Given s and r, the
payoff of agent i is









δtq(ht|s, r)p(θt)r(γt|ht)ui(gt(s(ht, θt, γt)), θt).
2.2.5 Repeated Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
A profile of strategies s is a Nash equilibrium if vi(s|r) ≥ vi((s′i, s−i)|r) for all i
and s′i. A regime r repeatedly implements a social choice function f if the set
of Nash equilibria is non-empty and for each Nash equilibrium s, we have that
gt(s(ht, θt, γt)) = f(θt) in case of simply-stochastic regimes or gt(s(ht, θt, γt))(f(θt)) =
1 in case of doubly-stochastic regimes for all t ∈ T , all θt ∈ Θ, all ht such that
q(ht|s, r) > 0, and all γt such that r(γt|ht) > 0. A social choice function f is
repeatedly implementable in Nash equilibrium if there exists a regime r that re-
peatedly implements f . The payoff of agent i if f is repeatedly implemented is
vfi :=
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(f(θ), θ). Let v
f = (vf1 , . . . , v
f
n).
6We only study Nash implementation in pure strategies.
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3 Necessary Conditions and Theorem 1
In this section, we derive conditions that a social choice functions must satisfy
for it to be repeatedly implementable. These conditions apply for any number of
agents, n ≥ 2. For an arbitrary set X, let Li(x, θ) denote the lower contour set
of agent i at outcome x ∈ X in state θ. The set X can be a subset of ∆A × V ,
in which case the agent’s preferences are described by Ui(·, ·, θ), or X can be
a subset of ∆A, in which case the agent’s preferences are described by ui(·, θ).
If the designer is only allowed to use deterministic mechanisms, then clearly X
belongs to A× V or A.
A necessary condition for a function to be one-shot implementable is Maskin
monotonicity due to Maskin (1999). We present it in a slightly modified form,
which allows to compare it conveniently with other notions of monotonicity that
will be defined later.
Definition 1 (Maskin monotonicity). f satisfies Maskin monotonicity with re-
spect to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ if for each i and θ, Ci(θ) ⊆ Li(f(θ), θ) and for all pairs
(θ, θ∗), we have that (a) implies (b):
a. Ci(θ) ⊆ Li(f(θ), θ∗) holds for all i,
b. f(θ) = f(θ∗).
Remark 1. f is Maskin monotonic w.r.t. some C (i.e., there exists such C)
if and only if f is Maskin monotonic w.r.t. C = (Li(f(θ), θ))i,θ, which gives
Maskin’s original definition (Maskin, 1999).7
The reason why Maskin monotonicity is necessary for one-shot implementa-
tion is that if all agents pretend in state θ∗ that the state is θ and no agent
has incentives to upset such a deception, then there is no hope for one-shot im-
plementation unless f(θ) = f(θ∗). Lee and Sabourian (2011) show that Maskin
monotonicity is neither necessary nor sufficient for repeated implementation. One
of the reasons is that the notion of deception becomes more complicated as it can
take place over many periods. Mezzetti and Renou (2014) provide the right def-
inition of monotonicity, which is necessary for repeated implementation. In the
next subsections, we introduce the notion of (dynamic) deception and a slightly
modified definition of dynamic monotonicity, which was originally proposed by
Mezzetti and Renou (2014).
3.1 Deceptions
Suppose that t ≥ 1. Let θ→t = (θ0, . . . , θt−1) and Θ→t be the set of all such
sequences. Let πt : Θ×Θ→t → Θ be a deception in period t. That is, πt specifies
7See, for example, the discussion in Moore and Repullo (1990) on page 1089.
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a state θ′ = πt(θ, θ→t) after any θ→t given that the period t state is θ. One can
think of it as if after θ→t all the agents pretend that the period t state of the
world is θ′ while in fact it is θ. Let π = (πt)t≥0 be a deception, where π
0 : Θ → Θ.
We will refer to π0 as a static deception. Also, let θ→0 = ∅ and Θ→0 = {∅}. The
continuation payoff of agent i, when the agents deceive according to π and the
designer selects an alternative according to f , is









where p(θ→t) = p(θ0) · . . . · p(θt−1) and p(θ→0) = 1. Finally, given a deception π
and some θ→t and θ, we denote by π(θ, θ→t) the continuation deception derived
in the obvious way from π.8
3.2 Dynamic Monotonicity
To gain better intuition for dynamic monotonicity, we start by introducing a
weaker version of Maskin monotonicity, which plays a useful role on its own in
the sequel.
Definition 2 (Maskin monotonicity*). f satisfies Maskin monotonicity* with
respect to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ if for each i and θ, Ci(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ) and for all
pairs (θ, θ∗), we have that (a) implies (b):
a. Ci(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ∗) holds for all i,
b. f(θ) = f(θ∗).
Remark 2. f is Maskin monotonic* w.r.t. some C if and only if f is Maskin
monotonic* w.r.t. C = (Li((f(θ), v
f ), θ))i,θ. Sometimes we will suppress the sets
with respect to which f is Maskin monotonic*. Also, f is Maskin monotonic* if
and only if the function (f(·), vf ) is Maskin monotonic over the set A× V .
Remark 3. Maskin monotonicity* is implied by Maskin monotonicity of f , but
the converse is not true. Also, Maskin monotonicity* is necessary for repeated
implementation (as argued below).
One can think of the necessity of Maskin monotonicity* as follows. Suppose
that there is a regime, which repeatedly implements f . Fix a Nash equilibrium
of this regime. Let Ci(θ) represent the set of alternative and continuation payoff
pairs that agent i can obtain by deviating from the equilibrium after some history
when the state is θ, given that all other agents play according to the fixed Nash
equilibrium. Now, as a thought experiment, suppose that f does not satisfy
8Note the distinction between a deception in period t, πt(θ, θ→t) and a deception from period
t onwards, π(θ, θ→t).
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Definition 2 for C, that is, part (a) of Definition 2 holds for some pair (θ, θ∗)
but we have that f(θ∗) ̸= f(θ). Consider now the following simple deception: in
the initial period, and only in this period, all agents pretend that the state is θ
when the true state is actually θ∗ and they continue to play the Nash equilibrium
strategies in the following periods as if they had not pretended in period 0. This
is another Nash equilibrium, in which the alternative f(θ) is implemented in
period 0 if the state is θ∗ and from the next period on, the agents expect vf since
they play the original Nash equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because no agent
has incentives to upset it in period 0 since, according to part (a) of Definition 2,
they all prefer what they get from the deception compared to what they can get
by demanding something from Ci(θ) for all i. No agent will also upset this Nash
equilibrium from period 1 onwards because vf is generated by a Nash equilibrium
from period 1 on.
Notice, however, that Maskin monotonicity* is far from being a sufficient con-
dition. The period 0 deception described above might be maintained by promis-
ing something better than vf from period 1 on, which in turn can be obtained
through deceptions, which support themselves. Hence the following definition:
Definition 3 (Dynamic Monotonicity (DM)). f is dynamically monotonic with
respect to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ if for each i and θ, we have Ci(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ) and
for any deception π, we have that (1) implies (2):
1. Ci(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf (π(θ∗, θ→t))), θ∗) holds for all i ∈ I, all t ∈ T , all
θ→t ∈ Θ→t, and all pairs (θ, θ∗) ∈ Θ×Θ for which πt(θ∗; θ→t) = θ,
2. f(πt(·; θ→t)) = f holds for all t ∈ T and all θ→t ∈ Θ→t.
Remark 4. f is dynamically monotonic w.r.t. some C if and only if f is dy-
namically monotonic w.r.t. C = (Li((f(θ), v
f ), θ))i,θ, which is the definition of
dynamic monotonicity in Mezzetti and Renou (2014). Obviously, if f is dynam-
ically monotonic, then it is Maskin monotonic*.
Whether a function is dynamically monotonic or not depends on the regime
considered. Namely, any function, which is DM for simply-stochastic regimes, is
also DM for doubly-stochastic regimes. The converse, however, is not true. The
reason is that for simply-stochastic regimes, Ci(θ) is a subset of A× V , while for
doubly-stochastic regimes, it is a subset of ∆A × V , and similarly for the lower
contour sets. In the definition, we do not emphasize whether the sets (Ci(θ))i,θ
belong to A×V or ∆A×V , but it should be understood from the regime, which
one we are considering.
The proof of the following proposition follows directly from Theorem 1 in
Mezzetti and Renou (2014) and from Remark 4 above.
Proposition 1 (Necessity of Dynamic Monotonicity). If f is repeatedly imple-
mentable, then f satisfies dynamic monotonicity with respect to some C.
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It turns out that dynamic monotonicity is also sufficient if the designer can
use doubly-stochastic regimes as we prove in Corollary 1 in Section 4. However,
if the designer is restricted to use only deterministic stage mechanisms (but pos-
sibly stochastic transitions), then we need additional conditions, which together
with dynamic monotonicity are sufficient for repeated implementation. These
conditions also turn out to be necessary and are derived in the spirit of Moore
and Repullo (1990) in the next section.
3.3 Further Necessary Conditions for Simply-Stochastic
Regimes
Here we use the assumption of strict preferences, but similar necessary conditions
can be designed for weak preferences as well.
We start by introducing additional notation. For a set X ⊆ A × V , let
Mi(X, θ) = argmaxx∈X Ui(x, θ). Note that Mi(X, θ) can be empty if X is not
a closed set. Also, let ai(θ) = argmaxa∈A ui(a, θ), ai(θ) = argmina∈A ui(a, θ),
vi :=
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(ai(θ), θ), and vi :=
∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)ui(ai(θ), θ). Finally, let Ai =
{ai(θ)|θ ∈ Θ}.
Suppose that a social choice function f is repeatedly implementable using a
simply-stochastic regime r. Take a strategy profile s that is a Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by regime r. Consider a history ht and a mechanism γt for
some t such that q(ht|s, r) > 0 and r(γt|ht) > 0. Let Ci(ht, θ, γt) ⊆ A × V be
the set of alternative and continuation payoff pairs that agent i can attain by
deviating in period t given that the period t state is θ and the other agents follow
s−i. Let Ci(θ) = ∪t ∪{ht|q(ht|s,r)>0} ∪{γt|r(γt|ht)>0}Ci(ht, θ, γt).
Consider the following situation. Suppose that, on the one hand, there exist
an agent i, a pair of states (θ, θ∗), and an alternative and continuation payoff pair
(b, v) such that (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗), vi = vi and b = aj(θ∗) for all j ∈ I\{i}.
And, on the other hand, there exists a static deception π0 : Θ → Θ such that
ai(π
0(θ′)) = aj(θ
′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I\{i}. Then, it is easy to see that one can
construct a new Nash equilibrium in the following way. There must be a history
(ht, θ, γt) for some t such that q(ht|s, r) > 0, r(γt|ht) > 0, and (b, v) ∈ Ci(ht, θ, γt).
Consider now history (ht, θ∗, γt). Let agents −i play after that history as if the
state was θ instead of θ∗ and let agent i “demand” (b, v). In the continuation,
agents −i pretend to play according to s−i, using π0 in each period. Let us
denote the continuation payoff that agent i gets under such a strategy profile by
vi(π
0), which can only be larger or equal to vi since vi = vi. Agent i cannot
have a continuation strategy, which would increase his continuation payoff above
vi(π
0), as otherwise he could already obtain a higher continuation payoff than
vi, when agents −i do not pretend according π0 but truly follow s−i.9 This joint
9In case of weak preferences, the argument is somewhat more involved, which leads to a
slightly more complicated necessary condition.
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deviation from s can be clearly maintained as a Nash equilibrium since agent i
will be (weakly) worse off if he does not demand (b, v) and agents −i play truly
s−i (i.e., because (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗)). On the other hand, agents −i get their
best possible payoffs. Therefore, if f is repeatedly implementable, the following
condition must necessarily hold:10
Condition λ0. f satisfies λ0 relative to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ:
If for some agent i and some pair of states (θ, θ∗), there exists an alternative
and continuation payoff pair (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗) such that vi = vi and b =
aj(θ
∗) for all j ∈ I\{i}, and there exists a static deception π0 : Θ → Θ such
that ai(π
0(θ′)) = aj(θ
′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I\{i}, then f(θ∗) = b and f(θ′) =
ai(π
0(θ′)) = aj(θ
′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I\{i}.
Similarly, consider the following situation. Suppose that there exist an agent
i, a pair of states (θ, θ∗), and an alternative and continuation payoff pair (b, v)
such that (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗), vi = vi and b = aj(θ∗) for all j ∈ I\{i} and it
is true that ai(θ
′) = aj(θ
′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I\{i}. Then again, given the Nash
equilibrium s, we can construct another Nash equilibrium in the following way.
There must be a history (ht, θ, γt) for some t such that q(ht|s, r) > 0, r(γt|ht) > 0,
and (b, v) ∈ Ci(ht, θ, γt). Consider now history (ht, θ∗, γt). Let agents −i play
after that history as if the state was θ and let agent i “demand” (b, v). In period
t and in the continuation, all agents simply get their best possible alternatives.
This is clearly a Nash equilibrium. Thus, if f is repeatedly implementable, then
the following condition must also necessarily hold:
Condition λ1. f satisfies λ1 relative to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ:
If for some agent i and some pair of states (θ, θ∗), there exists an alternative and
continuation payoff pair (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗) such that vi = vi and b = aj(θ∗)
for all j ∈ I\{i}, and if it is true that ai(θ′) = aj(θ′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I\{i},
then f(θ∗) = b and f(θ′) = aj(θ
′) for all θ′ and j ∈ I.
The interested reader can compare these conditions (see also Example 1 in
Section C) to the non-necessary conditions imposed by Lee and Sabourian (2011)
(Assumption A and Condition ω) and by Mezzetti and Renou (2014) (no veto
power or Assumption A). The main idea here is that we do not have to restrict
attention to the lower contour sets but we look at the sets (Ci(θ))i,θ, which are
generated by some equilibrium of some regime. That is, it can be that the
lower contour sets are not appropriate for implementation and one has to restrict
what a “whistle blower” can demand when upsetting undesired equilibria without
introducing new ones.
10See Example 2 for f that does not satisfy Condition λ0.
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3.4 Theorem 1
Conditions λ0 and λ1 are not only necessary, but together with dynamic mono-
tonicity, are also sufficient for repeated implementation when n > 2. It is formally
stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. When n > 2, f is repeatedly implementable with a simply-stochastic
regime if and only if there is a collection C with respect to which f is dynamically
monotonic and relative to which f satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1.
Proof. To prove the only-if-part, consider C as constructed in Section 3.3. It
immediately follows from Proposition 1 that f is dynamically monotonic with
respect C. As argued in Section 3.3, f must also satisfy Conditions λ0 and
λ1 relative to C. The proof of the if-part can be found in Section A in the
Appendix.
Remark 5. The only-if-part of Theorem 1 also holds for n = 2.
Now, we informally describe the regime used to prove the sufficiency part of
Theorem 1. It is a modification of the regime in Mezzetti and Renou (2014). To
highlight our modifications, we start by briefly outlining their regime. It starts
in period 0 with a mechanism that is similar to the canonical mechanism used
in one-shot implementation. The regime continues to employ this mechanism
as long as there has been no disagreement in agents’ messages in the past. If,
in any period, there is a single agent whose message differs from the messages
of the other agents and who demands an alternative and continuation payoff
pair from his lower contour set, then the demanded alternative is implemented
in that period. Further, a scalar λ ∈ [0, 1] is calculated, which determines the
probabilities of using two different mechanisms from the next period onwards.
The scalar is calculated so that the deviator expects his demanded continuation
payoff provided that with probability λ, he becomes a dictator forever and receives
his highest continuation payoff, and with probability 1−λ, he is punished forever
and gets his lowest continuation payoff. For all other message profiles of the
agents, the agent announcing the highest integer becomes a dictator forever with
probability 1.
Unwanted equilibria, in which agents’ reports differ, are taken care in Mezzetti
and Renou (2014) by no-veto power assumption (or Assumption A). The main
idea behind our modifications is that such equilibria can almost always be elimi-
nated by creating competition between the agents if their messages differ. First,
whenever 0 < λ < 1, we additionally allow the designer to choose one of the
alternatives forever with strictly positive, uniform probabilities. Because of strict
preferences, the agents do not get their highest continuation payoffs with cer-
tainty, giving them incentives to trigger the integer game. Second, in the integer
game, an agent becomes a dictator always with a probability strictly less than 1,
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although by announcing higher and higher integers, he can increase this proba-
bility. With the remaining probability, again a constant alternative is uniformly
chosen forever. This eliminates any equilibria in the integer game.
The power of competition cannot be exploited only when a deviator demands
his lowest or highest continuation payoff, i.e., when λ = 0 or λ = 1. In that case,
Conditions λ0 and λ1 ensure that there are no undesirable equilibria. However,
these conditions might be violated if the deviator is allowed to choose anything
in his lower contour set. Therefore, our third modification is to replace the
lower contour sets with smaller sets given by collection C that still preserve the
dynamic monotonicity of the social choice function but, at the same time, satisfy
Conditions λ0 and λ1. Taken together, these modifications allow us to dispense
of no-veto power. Finally, any unwanted equilibria, in which agents’ reports
are unanimous, are taken care by dynamic monotonicity just as in Mezzetti and
Renou (2014).
4 Repeated Implementation with Doubly Stochas-
tic Regimes
In this section, we are going to show that if the designer can additionally use ran-
dom stage mechanisms, then the premises of the cumbersome necessary Condi-
tions λ0 and λ1, introduced in Section 3.3, become empty for some appropriately
chosen C and, hence, these conditions are dispensable. Then, it immediately fol-
lows that dynamic monotonicity in itself is a necessary and sufficient condition for
repeated implementation. Moreover, we can implement strictly more functions
than with deterministic stage mechanisms. There are two independent reasons
for this.
First, if we have to pick the sets C = (Ci(θ))i∈I,θ∈Θ as subsets of A×V , it can
be that we do not find such a collection C with respect to which f is dynamically
monotonic. However, if these sets can be chosen from ∆A× V , we can find such
a collection for the same function.11
Second, it still can be that we find a collection C, consisting of subsets of
A × V , with respect to which f is dynamically monotonic, but relative to any
such collection C, f does not satisfy either Condition λ0 or λ1. However, if
the collection can be built from subsets of ∆A × V , then satisfying dynamic
monotonicity and Conditions λ0 and λ1 might become possible. In fact, we show
that whenever a function is dynamically monotonic with respect to some C, then
there always exists another collection D consisting of sets from ∆A × V such
that our function is dynamically monotonic with respect to D and the premises
of Conditions λ0 and λ1 become empty, that is, these conditions are satisfied
11Now, of course, in the definition of dynamic monotonicity, one should consider the lower
contour sets corresponding to the preferences over the set ∆A× V .
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automatically. Thus, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. When n > 2, f is repeatedly implementable with a doubly-stochastic
regime if and only if there is a collection C = (Ci(θ))i∈I,θ∈Θ of subsets of ∆A×V
with respect to which f is dynamically monotonic.
To prove this result, we connect the repeated implementation problem to the
theory of repeated games and make use of some recent results. Then, we have our
result as a simple corollary of the following lemmas and Theorem 1. We should
stress that it is not obvious that one can innocuously replace a “whistle”, i.e.,
a pair (a, v), which violates Conditions λ0 or λ1, with a nearby whistle without
violating dynamic monotonicity. The reason is that a single whistle might be
responsible for breaking infinitely many deceptions.12
4.1 A Repeated Game Associated to an Implementation
Environment
Given the repeated implementation environment as described in Section 2, we
now construct an associated repeated game with discounting, perfect monitor-
ing, and random states. This game will be useful to show that we can always
replace elements of the sets (Ci(θ))i,θ with nearby elements while preserving the
dynamic monotonicity of f . Further, in Section 5, we will discuss how the dy-
namic monotonicity of f can be checked numerically with the help of this game.
Let us fix Ci(θ) ⊆ ∪θ∗∈ΘMi(Li((f(θ), vf ), θ∗) for all i and θ such that there
exists (a, v) ∈ Ci(θ) ∩Mi(Li((f(θ), vf ), θ∗)) for all θ∗, and Ci(θ) is minimal with
respect to set inclusion; hence, Ci(θ) is finite. Let C = (Ci(θ))i,θ. It is easy to see
that f is dynamically monotonic with respect to lower contour sets if and only if
it is dynamically monotonic with respect to C.
For any pair of states (θ, θ∗), with slight abuse of notation, let ui(θ, θ
∗) =
Ui(b, v, θ
∗)/(1 − δ) = ui(b, θ∗) + δvi/(1 − δ) for some (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗).
Note that ui(θ, θ
∗) is the same for all (b, v) ∈ Mi(Ci(θ), θ∗). Also, ui(θ, θ) =
Ui(f(θ), v
f , θ)/(1− δ).
The repeated game ΓC , given C, is as follows. A state θ ∈ Θ is drawn each
period i.i.d. according to p, each player i corresponds to agent i, and the action
sets of the stage game are Ai = A = Θ ∪ {ω, o}. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that ui(a, θ) > 0 for all i, a, and θ in the implementation problem.
Then, for an action profile x ∈ An in state θ∗, the stage game payoffs of the
players are defined as follows:
1. ui(x, θ
∗) = ui(f(θ), θ
∗) if xj = θ for all j. (In the implementation problem,
12An alternative proof is also available that does not require building an associated repeated
game. However, in that proof, the collection C that vacuously satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1
consists of open sets. Besides, the current proof is also useful for discussion in Section 5.
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it corresponds to the situation when everyone claims that the state is θ
while the true state is θ∗.)
2. ui(x, θ
∗) = ui(θ, θ
∗) if xj = θ for all j ∈ I\{i} and xi = ω. (It corresponds
to the situation when all but agent i claim that the state is θ but the true




∗) = 0 if xi = o.
4. ui(x, θ
∗) ≪ 0 for any other x ∈ An, which does not fall under any of the
above points. (When we write that a payoff is ≪ 0, we mean that it is
so negative that the corresponding action profile can never be played on a
Nash equilibrium path of the repeated game.)
For a numerical example on how to calculate the stage game payoffs, see Example
3 in Section C.
Given a sequence of actions, (xt(θ))t∈T,θ∈Θ, the payoff of player i in the re-






t(θ), θ). We are going to
look at the set of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoffs, E(ΓC) of the re-
peated game ΓC , which in our case coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium
payoffs of ΓC .13
4.2 The Set of Equilibrium Payoffs of the Repeated Game
Consider an arbitrary function f , the sets C, which are derived from the lower
contour sets as described in the previous section, and the associated repeated
game ΓC . As C is fixed in the sequel, we simply write Γ = ΓC . We say that
D = (Di(θ))i,θ is a good collection if Di(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf )), θ) ⊆ ∆A × V is
compact for all i and θ. In particular, C is a good collection. Then, for any
good collection D, one can define an associated game ΓD as before. In particular,
we can pick any element (b, v) ∈ Mi(Di(θ), θ∗) for each i, θ, θ∗ and calculate
uDi (θ, θ
∗) = Ui(b, v, θ
∗)/(1 − δ) = ui(b, θ∗) + δvi/(1 − δ). We also specify payoffs
in ΓD, which are ≪ 0, to be the same as in Γ.
For any two vectors k, k′ from some finite dimensional vector space RN , denote
by d(k, k′) = maxi=1,...,N |ki − k′i| the distance between k and k′. Then, for a
compact set X in this vector space, the ε-fattening of X is Xε = ∪k∈X{k′ ∈
RN |d(k, k′) ≤ ε}. We say that D is ξ > 0 close to C (which we have fixed before)
if it is a good collection and d(ΓD,Γ) ≤ ξ. (By d(ΓD,Γ), we mean the distance
between the stage game payoffs of the two games across all players, states, and
13We have to look at subgame perfect Nash equilibria because the operator, introduced by
Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990), does not work for the set of Nash equilibria in general,
which was pointed out to us by George Mailath.
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action profiles. This distance is well-defined because both games have the same
dimensions.)
For all pairs of states, (θ, θ∗), denote by QΓ(θ, θ
∗) = {v ∈ V |∀i : ui(θ, θ∗) ≤
ui(f(θ), θ
∗) + δ/(1 − δ)vi} the compact set of continuation payoffs for which
it is incentive compatible for all players to play action θ in the stage game of
Γ when the state is θ∗. Similarly, let QΓD(θ, θ
∗) = {v ∈ V |∀i : uDi (θ, θ∗) ≤
ui(f(θ), θ
∗) + δ/(1− δ)vi}.
It must be obvious that the players can play θ in state θ∗ on an equilibrium
path of ΓD for some good collection D if and only if QΓD(θ, θ
∗) ∩ E(ΓD) ̸= ∅.
Hence, the following lemma holds trivially:
Lemma 1. f is dynamically monotonic with respect to a good collection D if and
only if for all θ, θ∗ with θ ̸= θ∗, QΓD(θ, θ∗) ∩ E(ΓD) = ∅.
We have the following result:
Lemma 2. f is dynamically monotonic with respect to a good collection D if and
only if:
1. f is Maskin monotonic* with respect to D,
2. vf is the unique strictly efficient equilibrium payoff of ΓD.
Proof. Suppose f is dynamically monotonic with respect D. Then it is trivially
Maskin monotonic* with respect to D. To establish that vf is the unique strictly
efficient equilibrium payoff, we first claim that (0, . . . , 0) and vf are equilibrium
payoffs of ΓD. (0, . . . , 0) is obtained by all players playing o in each stage in every
state. vf is attained if in each stage, all players play the action that coincides
with the state of the world of that stage. This can be supported as an equilibrium
if after any deviation, all players play o forever. Therefore, the deviator gets the
same payoff that he would obtain if he followed the original strategy. Now, by
construction, in any equilibrium of ΓD, only the action profiles on the diagonal
of the stage game can be played. Even more, from Lemma 1, it follows that in
equilibrium, at any stage, either all players must choose o or θ where θ is the
state of the world of that stage. However, any equilibrium strategy that involves
playing o by all players at some stage, will result in equilibrium payoffs v < vf .
This establishes point 2 in the lemma.
On the other hand, suppose that points 1 and 2 are satisfied but f is not
dynamically monotonic with respect D. By Lemma 1, this means that there is a
pair (θ, θ∗) such that θ ̸= θ∗ and QΓD(θ, θ∗)∩ E(ΓD) ̸= ∅. But then because vf is
the unique efficient equilibrium payoff, it follows that vf ∈ QΓD(θ, θ∗) ∩ E(ΓD),
which in turn contradicts Maskin monotonicity* of f with respect to D.
Lemma 3. If f is dynamically monotonic with respect to C, then there exists
ε > 0 such that for all θ, θ∗ with θ ̸= θ∗, it is true that QΓ(θ, θ∗) ∩ E(Γ)ε = ∅.
Moreover, there is ξ > 0 such that QΓD(θ, θ
∗) ∩ E(Γ)ε = ∅ if D is ξ−close to C.
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Proof. Due to finiteness of the action and state spaces of the stage game, we can
find ε > 0 such that for all θ, θ∗ with θ ̸= θ∗, we have that {vf}ε ∩QΓ(θ, θ∗) = ∅.
We know from point 2 of Lemma 2 (by taking D = C) that v < vf for all
v ∈ E(Γ)\{vf}. This implies that {v}ε ∩ QΓ(θ, θ∗) = ∅ for all v ∈ E(Γ). This
establishes the first claim of the lemma. Finally, by compactness, there is ξ > 0
such that QΓD(θ, θ
∗) ∩ E(Γ)ε = ∅ if D is ξ−close to C.
Lemma 4. If f is dynamically monotonic with respect to C, then there exists
ξ > 0 such that f is dynamically monotonic with respect to any good collection
D, which is ξ-close to C.
Proof. Suppose f is dynamically monotonic with respect to C. Due to finiteness
of the state and action spaces, it follows from the upper-semicontinuity of E(·)
(see Propositions 19 and 20 in Plan (2014)14) that for any ε > 0, there is ξ > 0
such that E(ΓD) ⊂ E(Γ)ε if d(ΓD,Γ) ≤ ξ. By Lemma 3, if ε > 0 and ξ > 0 are
small enough, we have that for all θ, θ∗ with θ ̸= θ∗, QΓD(θ, θ∗) ∩ E(Γ)ε = ∅ and,
hence, QΓD(θ, θ
∗) ∩ E(ΓD) = ∅. Lemma 1 completes the proof.
4.3 Proof of Corollary 1
We only have to prove sufficiency. Take a social choice function f , which is
dynamically monotonic. Consider the collection C as constructed in the very
beginning of Section 4.1. If for all i and θ, we have that Ci(θ) does not contain
the alternative and continuation payoff pairs, in which agent i gets his minimal
or maximal continuation payoff, then Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorem
1 as f vacuously satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1 relative to C. If this is not the
case, then we are going to replace Ci(θ) with some Di(θ) for all i and θ so as
to preserve dynamic monotonicity of f with respect to D = (Di(θ))i,θ, while at
the same time no player can ever demand his worst or best continuation payoff
(i.e., Conditions λ0 and λ1 become empty). Then the proof of Corollary 1 again
follows from Theorem 1 by setting C = D. We only have to show how to replace
some elements of the sets of C to obtain D.
Suppose that for some (b, v) ∈ Ci(θ), we have that vi is the maximal continu-
ation payoff of agent i. But then vi can be slightly decreased and, due to Lemma
4,15 (b, v) can be replaced with (b, v′), which eliminates the case when the premise
of Condition λ1 applies.
The case of Condition λ0 is slightly more involved and requires the use of
stochastic stage mechanisms. Suppose that for some (b, v) ∈ Ci(θ), we have
that vi is the minimal continuation payoff of agent i. Now, if (f(θ), v
f ) is strictly
preferred by agent i to (b, v) at θ, then vi can be slightly increased (while ensuring
14The upper-semicontinuity of E(·) is established in Plan (2014) only for games without
random states but the proof also works for games with random states.
15Ci(θ) is finite for all i and θ, and we obtain Di(θ) by replacing a finite number of elements
in Ci(θ). Therefore, D is a good collection and we can invoke Lemma 4.
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that (f(θ), vf ) is still the best for agent i under θ) and (b, v) can be replaced with
(b, v′) ∈ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ) where v′i > vi. This maintains the dynamic monotonicity
of f , again due to Lemma 4. The interesting case is when agent i is indifferent
between (f(θ), vf ) and (b, v) in state θ. There are two cases to consider. If
vi = v
f
i , then by strict preferences,
16 we have that b = f(θ), in which case (b, v)
is never used to destroy a deception. If vi ̸= vfi , then it cannot be that b is the
worst alternative for i at θ. In this case, we replace (b, v) with a close enough
alternative and continuation payoff pair (b̃, v′) ∈ ∆A × V by slightly increasing
the continuation payoff and by slightly decreasing the expected payoff from the
alternative, while ensuring (b̃, v′) ∈ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ). Due to Lemma 4, this can
be done without losing dynamic monotonicity. This eliminates the case when the
premise of Condition λ0 applies.
Finally, given the constructed good collection D, Corollary 1 simply follows
from Theorem 1 since, by Lemma 4, f is dynamically monotonic with respect to
D and f satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1 relative to D vacuously.
5 Testing DM by Using Repeated Games
It is obvious from the definition of DM that to check in practice whether f is DM
or not, one has to consider infinity of possible deceptions, which is impossible
(unless one is lucky to find a deception, which does not satisfy the condition
required for DM). In this section, we informally discuss existing results from the
literature of repeated games, which can help in verifying DM, given the connection
between DM and the equilibrium payoff set of the the associated repeated game
that we have established in Section 4.2.
In what follows, we assume that the agents have access to a public random-
ization device, which draws a uniformly distributed random variable from the
unit interval independently in each period. Now, of course, one should consider
also random deceptions in the definition of DM. It should be clear that the set
of functions, which are DM, decreases when the agents can play correlated pure
strategies. However, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 continue to hold with public
randomization, as do Lemmas 1 to 4.
Lemma 2 tells us that DM of a function can be checked by finding the equilib-
rium payoff set of the associated repeated game with random states and a fixed
discount factor, which is described in Section 4.1. To find the equilibrium pay-
off set, one can apply the methods developed in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
16Notice that this is the only place where we use the assumption of strict preferences. If
preferences are not strict, then it can be that agent i is indifferent between f(θ) and b at θ,
and (b, v) is used to destroy a deception at some θ∗. A simple, though, extra assumption would
suffice to circumvent such situations, namely, requiring that there is a unique worst alternative
for each agent at each θ.
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(1990) and Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003).17 While the method of Abreu,
Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) is an outer approximation of the equilibrium set,
Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) offer both outer and inner approximations of
the equilibrium set. If a social choice function is DM, then according to Lemma
2, the outer and inner approximations should18 converge to a set in which vf
is strictly efficient. On the other hand, if the social choice function is not DM,
then again according to Lemma 2, the outer and inner approximations should
converge to a set in which vf is not strictly efficient.
Finally, we must mention a recent result in Abreu and Sannikov (2014), which
states that there are finitely many extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set
of the repeated game if the number of agents is two. Although their result is
without random states, it easily extends to repeated games with random states.
A closer look at their result (see their proof of Theorem 4) tells that if we are
only interested in the efficient equilibria (since it is enough to consider efficient
deceptions), any efficient equilibrium payoff can be achieved in strategies that
use public randomization, in which the current period’s randomization is solely
determined by the realization of the previous period’s randomization. In our
case, the randomization should also depend on the realized states in the current
and previous periods. That is, to check dynamic monotonicity of a function,
there is no need to check all deceptions. It is enough if one checks all deceptions
with public randomization, which are Markov in the current and previous period’s
states and in the realization of the previous period’s public randomization. In case
the number of players is more than 2, it is easy to construct examples of efficient
equilibria that are not Markov (as specified above) but use longer memory.
6 Implementing Efficient Functions
Here we connect Lee and Sabourian (2011)’s notion of efficiency in the range to
dynamic monotonicity.
Definition 4 (Efficiency in the range). Let V f = {v ∈ V |∃π0 : Θ → ∆Θ : v =∑
θ∈Θ p(θ)u(f(π
0(θ)), θ)}. f is efficient (resp., weakly efficient) in the range if
there is no v ∈ V f such that vi ≥ vfi (resp., vi > v
f
i ) for all i and vj > v
f
j for
some j. That is, f is efficient in the range when vf is Pareto efficient within the
17Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990)’s result is established without public randomization
but covering the case of random states, while Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003)’s result is
established with public randomization but without covering the case of random states. Both
results easily extend to our setup.
18Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003) present several examples in which their method con-
verges to the true equilibrium set. However, as the speed of convergence is unknown, one has
no guarantee that the almost convergence is reached after some given, finite number of itera-
tions. Abreu and Sannikov (2014) offer a modification of Judd, Yeltekin, and Conklin (2003)
algorithm, which improves its performance but one must still count with the same problem.
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set V f . f is strictly efficient in the range if it is efficient in the range and there





Lee and Sabourian (2011) in their Theorem 1 show that if f is not weakly
efficient in the range, then f is not implementable for δ sufficiently large. To
understand this result, one can think that the agents use a stationary (i.e., his-
tory independent) random deception, which strictly Pareto dominates vf .19 On
the other hand, for their sufficiency result, Lee and Sabourian (2011) in their
Theorem 2 require that f is strictly efficient in the range to obtain outcome im-
plementation. Further, they invoke their Assumption A and Condition ω. In the
following proposition, we improve on this result by requiring only efficiency in
the range and Maskin monotonicity*, where the latter is a necessary conditions
for implementation.
Proposition 2. If f is efficient in the range and Maskin monotonic*, then f is
dynamically monotonic and, hence, it is repeatedly implementable with a doubly-
stochastic regime when n > 2.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the argument in the proof of Remark 4 in
Mezzetti and Renou (2014), but instead of Maskin monotonicity (which is not
necessary), Maskin monotonicity* (which is necessary) is used in the last step.
Corollary 1 then completes the proof.
Since verifying efficiency in the range and Maskin monotonicity* is relatively
easy, the result of Proposition 2 offers a simple way to confirm DM of f , especially,
when δ is large.
6.1 An Application
As an application of Proposition 2, we study the repeated implementation of
(generalized) utilitarian social choice functions.
Definition 5. A social choice correspondence, fu, is utilitarian if there exists
(βi)i∈I such that for each θ ∈ Θ,
fu(θ) =
{







and βi ≥ 0 for all i, and βj > 0 for some j.
Remark 6. fu is ex ante weakly efficient and, hence, it is weakly efficient in
the range. If fu(θ) is single-valued for all θ, then fu is (strictly) efficient in the
range.
19Lee and Sabourian (2011) dispense with public randomization by invoking the result of
Fudenberg and Maskin (1991).
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The one-shot implementation of the utilitarian social choice correspondences,
especially in dominant strategies, has been extensively studied in the literature
(see, for example, Groves (1973)). We show that they are repeatedly imple-
mentable when we restrict the domain of preferences as in Laffont and Maskin
(1982). Specifically, we assume that A = [0, 1], and for each i and θ, ui(a, θ) is
strictly concave and differentiable function in the first argument and it attains
its maximum for some a ∈ (0, 1). We also assume that in each state θ, fu(θ)





u(θ), θ) = 0 (where the
derivative is taken with respect to the first argument). The assumptions also
imply that fu(θ) ∈ (0, 1) for all θ and vf
u
i > vi for all i. Unlike Laffont and
Maskin (1982), we rule out monetary transfers, and we maintain the assumption
that the state space Θ is finite.
The utilitarian social choice function does not need to be Maskin monotonic,
but Laffont and Maskin (1982) have shown that a social choice rule consisting
of the utilitarian social choice function fu and, for example, a constant private
transfer function, is Maskin monotonic (see Theorem 5 and its proof in Laffont
and Maskin (1982)). The following proposition, in essence, establishes that in the
repeated setup, the continuation payoffs can play the role of monetary transfers.
All we have to make sure of is that the transfers can be chosen to be arbitrarily
small.
Proposition 3. fu is Maskin monotonic*.
Proof. Suppose, first, that u′i(f
u(θ), θ) = u′i(f






u(θ), θ′) = 0 holds, implying that fu(θ′) = fu(θ).
Therefore, suppose u′i(f
u(θ), θ) ̸= u′i(fu(θ), θ′) for some i with βi > 0. We will
argue that there exists (a, vi) such that ui(f
u(θ), θ) + vf
u
i ≥ ui(a, θ) + vi and
ui(f
u(θ), θ′) + vf
u
i < ui(a, θ
′) + vi. Because of the strict concavity of ui(·, θ), we
have that
ui(f
u(θ), θ) > ui(f
u(θ) + η, θ)− u′i(fu(θ), θ)η.
Likewise, by taking the Taylor expansion of ui(·, θ′) around fu(θ), we have
ui(f
u(θ), θ′) = ui(f
u(θ) + η, θ′)− u′i(fu(θ), θ′)η + h(η)η
where limη→0 h(η) = 0. By choosing η > 0 when u
′
i(f
u(θ), θ′) > u′i(f
u(θ), θ) and
η < 0 when u′(fu(θ), θ′) < u′(fu(θ), θ), we have that
ui(f
u(θ), θ′) < ui(f
u(θ) + η, θ′)− u′i(fu(θ), θ)η
since the second order effect of h(η)η can be ignored if |η| is small enough. To
summarize, we can set a = fu(θ) + η and vi = v
fu
i − u′i(fu(θ), θ)η where the
sign of η is determined as before. Note that vi can be chosen sufficiently close to
vf
u
i to ensure vi < vi < vi as long as v
fu
i < vi holds. If v
fu
i = vi, then one can
set a = fu(θ′) and vi = v
fu
i since f
u(·) = ai(·) and, consequently, ui(fu(θ), θ) >
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ui(f
u(θ′), θ) and ui(f
u(θ), θ′) < ui(f
u(θ′), θ′) due to strict concavity must hold.
Hence, whenever part (b) of Definition 2 does not hold, part (a) also does not
hold for some i.
From Proposition 2 and Remark 6, it then follows that fu is dynamically
monotonic and is repeatedly implementable when n > 2. On the other hand, fu
does not need to satisfy no-veto power, as Example 4 in Section C illustrates.
Therefore, one cannot apply the results of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) to show
that fu is repeatedly implementable. In fact, the example demonstrates that the
regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) possesses an undesirable equilibrium. Also,
while fu is strictly efficient in its range, Condition ω of Lee and Sabourian (2011)
does not need to hold. Therefore, their Theorem 2 cannot also be invoked to
establish that fu is implementable.
7 The Case of Two Agents
In this section, we assume that the number of agents is n = 2. While we have
not identified sufficient and necessary conditions for implementation when n = 2,
we offer sufficient conditions that improve on the existing results in literature.
Clearly, any necessary and sufficient conditions for the two agent case must
include the necessary and sufficient conditions for the case of more than two
agents. However, when n = 2, the designer must additionally and independently
of other conditions face the problem that the agents are sending different messages
but the “deviator” cannot be identified. In the static setup, this is known as
the self-selection problem and the corresponding necessary condition has been
identified by Moore and Repullo (1990) and Dutta and Sen (1991).
For our first result, we are going to use a version of static self-selection.
Definition 6 (Self-selection*). f satisfies self-selection* relative to C = (Ci(θ))i,θ
if for each i and θ, we have (f(θ), vf ) ∈ Ci(θ) ⊆ Li((f(θ), vf ), θ) ⊆ ∆A× V and
for all pairs (θ1, θ2),
1. There exists b(θ1, θ2) ∈ ∆A such that (b(θ1, θ2), vf ) ∈ C1(θ2) ∩ C2(θ1);
2. If for some θ∗, it is true that (b(θ1, θ2), v
f ) ∈ M1(C1(θ2), θ∗)∩M2(C2(θ1), θ∗),
then f(θ∗) = b(θ1, θ2).
Part 1 in Definition 6 is just a static self-selection condition that has also been
assumed by Lee and Sabourian (2011).20 It ensures that the designer can pick an
alternative when observing contradictory messages in a way that does not upset
the truth-telling equilibrium, i.e., if one agent tells the truth about the state, the
20Lee and Sabourian (2011) require that there exists b(θ1, θ2) ∈ L1(f(θ2), θ2)∩L2(f(θ1), θ1).
However, if such b(θ1, θ2) exists, then one can always include (b(θ1, θ2), v
f ) into both C1(θ2)
and C2(θ1).
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other agent cannot gain by lying about the state if b(θ1, θ2) is chosen. Part 2
can be thought of as a variation of Maskin monotonicity*. It says that if neither
agent has incentives to deviate in some state in some period when they receive
b(θ1, θ2) in that period and expect a payoff of v
f in the continuation, then b(θ1, θ2)
must be the desirable alternative according to f in that state. Neither part 1
nor part 2 of Definition 6 is, however, necessary for dynamic implementation.
Part 1 is unnecessary for a similar reason that Maskin monotonicity of f is not
necessary in the dynamic setup. Part 2 is not necessary because the agents might
not be able to get vf from the next period on since the designer can react to the
contradictory messages by “changing” the regime.
Proposition 4. If f is efficient and satisfies Maskin monotonicity* with respect
to some C = (Ci(θ))i,θ and self-selection* relative to that C, then f is repeatedly
implementable with a doubly-stochastic regime.
Proof. The detailed proof appears in Section B.1 in the Appendix. Here, we just
give a sketch of the proof. First, we show that for doubly-stochastic regimes, the
collection C can be modified in a way that f also satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1,
while preserving self-selection* and Maskin monotonicity* with respect to the
modified sets. This is done similarly to Corollary 1, except that we do not need
to invoke Lemma 4 because to preserve Maskin monotonicity*, we only need to
satisfy finitely many inequalities when modifying the sets. Besides, now we also
need to ensure that self-selection* continues to hold. Second, we slightly modify
our regime, which was designed for the case of at least 3 agents. The modification
takes care of the case when the designer observes contradictory messages in some
period, but the deviator cannot be identified. We specify that in such case,
the corresponding b(θ1, θ2) is implemented in that period (where θi is the state
announced by agent i), while in the next period, the regime continues as if there
has been no contradiction in messages. Third, we show that in any equilibrium in
period 0, both agents should expect a continuation payoff of vf due to efficiency
of f . Finally, Maskin monotonicity* and part 2 in the definition of self-selection*
ensure that the right alternative is implemented in period 0. The same argument
can then be applied for any period.
Couple observations are in order. First, we cannot weaken the assumption of
efficiency to efficiency in the range in Proposition 4 without strengthening the
definition of self-selection*. If alternative b(θ1, θ2) does not belong to the range
of f , then it can be that both agents prefer this alternative to what f would
give them in some state. Consequently, nothing guarantees that the equilibrium
continuation payoffs do not weakly Pareto dominate vf if f is only efficient in
the range. However, we can assume that f is efficient in the range in Proposition
4 if we additionally require in part 1 of Definition 6 that b(θ1, θ2) ∈ f(Θ) where
f(Θ) = {a ∈ A|a = f(θ) for some θ ∈ Θ} denotes the range of f .
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Second, Lee and Sabourian (2011) in their Theorem 3 state that f is payoff
implementable from the second period on if f satisfies self-selection (part 1 in
Definition 6), efficiency in the range and their usual domain restrictions.21 The
discussion in the previous paragraph tells that their assumptions about f are not
sufficient to guarantee the payoff implementation.22
Third, we cannot replace efficiency and Maskin monotonicity* with dynamic
monotonicity in Proposition 4 without strengthening the definition of self-selec-
tion* even further. It is because efficiency (in the range) pins down the con-
tinuation payoffs while dynamic monotonicity does not. Nevertheless, we show
that Corollary 1 carries over to the two agent case if additionally we assume the
existence of a bad outcome (for its use, see, e.g., Moore and Repullo (1990) or
Mezzetti and Renou (2014)).
Definition 7 (Bad Outcome). b̃ ∈ ∆A is a bad outcome relative to f if ui(b̃, θ′) <
ui(f(θ), θ
′) for all i, θ, and θ′.
To prove their Theorem 3, besides the bad outcome, Mezzetti and Renou
(2014) also invoke Assumption A. We improve on their result by dispensing of
Assumption A.23
Proposition 5. If there exists a bad outcome b̃ relative to f and f is dynamically
monotonic, then f is repeatedly implementable with a doubly-stochastic regime.
Proof. The detailed proof appears in Section B.2. Here, we give a sketch of the
proof. We modify the regime used in the proof of Proposition 4. First, obviously,
instead of implementing b(θ1, θ2) in the case of disagreement, we now implement
the bad outcome. Second, while in the proof of Proposition 4, the designer
proceeds in the next period as if there was no disagreement in the previous
period, here we require that the bad outcome is implemented forever. Then, in
any equilibrium, it must be that the agents send the same messages, in which
case dynamic monotonicity ensures that the right alternative is implemented.
Similar to self-selection*, having a bad outcome is not necessary for repeated
implementation. Mezzetti and Renou (2014) show that what they call dynamic
self-selection is necessary for repeated implementation. Essentially, it means that
function f ′(·) := (f(·), vf ) rather than f(·) must satisfy self-selection. How-
ever, even if one assumes that f ′(·) satisfies self-selection, it is not immediate
how the designer can implement the desired continuation payoffs in the case of
disagreement.24 Finding the necessary and sufficient conditions for repeated im-
plementation in the two agent case is left for future work.
21f is payoff implementable from period t if in any Nash equilibrium, the equilibrium payoffs
are vf from period t on.
22In Part (iii) of Lemma 3 in Lee and Sabourian (2011), it is only implicitly assumed that
b(θ1, θ2) ∈ f(Θ).
23Even if we only allow for simply-stochastic regimes, we can still improve by replacing
unnecessary Assumption A with necessary Conditions λ0 and λ1.
24For large discount factors, one could possibly apply Blackwell’s approachability result.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We only need to prove the sufficiency part of Theorem 1. The proof is constructive
– we define a regime and show that it implements f . Fix C = (Ci(θ))i,θ with
respect to which f is dynamically monotonic and f satisfies Conditions λ0 and
λ1 relative to C. In our regime, we are going to use the following deterministic
stage mechanisms.
Mechanism γ̂. For each agent i ∈ I, let the message space of agent i be
Mi = {(θ, b, v, z) ∈ Θ× A× V × Z+}, where Z+ denotes the set of nonnegative
integers. For a message profile m, let iz denote an agent who sends the highest
integer z, and let miz = (θz, bz, vz, zz). Given C = (Ci(θ))i,θ, define the allocation
rule g as follows:
I. If there exists (θ, b, v, z) ∈ Θ × A × V × Z+ such that mi = (θ, b, v, z) for
all i ∈ I, then g(m) = f(θ).
II. If there exists (θ, b, v, z) ∈ Θ × A × V × Z+ and i∗ ∈ I such that mi =
(θ, b, v, z) for all i ̸= i∗ and mi∗ = (θ′, b′, v′, z′) ̸= (θ, b, v, z), then
(a) g(m) = b′ if (b′, v′) ∈ Ci∗(θ).
(b) g(m) = f(θ) otherwise.
III. If neither (I) nor (II) applies, then g(m) = bz.
The second mechanism is a dictatorial mechanism for agent i:
Mechanism γ̃i(Mi). Let Mi ⊆ A, while Mj = {∅} for each j ∈ I\{i}. Let
g(m) = mi.








|A| for all i ∈ I, where |A| denotes the cardinality of
the set A. Our regime is defined as follows:
Regime r.
1. r(γ̂|h0) = 1.
2. For t ≥ 1 if r(γ̂|ht−1) = 1 and mt−1 = (mi)i∈I is such that
(a) Parts (I) or (IIb) of γ̂ applies, then r(γ̂|ht) = 1.
(b) Part (IIa) of γ̂ applies with mi∗ = (θ
′, b′, v′, z′), then
i. If vi∗ < v
′
i∗ ≤ v̂i∗ , then
ř(γ̃i∗({a})|ht) = λ/|A| for all a ∈ A,






ii. If v̂i∗ < v
′
i∗ < vi∗ , then
ř(γ̃i∗(A)|ht) = λ,






iii. If v′i∗ = vi∗ , then
r(γ̃i∗(A)|ht) = 1.
iv. If v′i∗ = vi∗ , then
r(γ̃i∗+1(Ai∗)|ht) = 1.
(c) Part (III) of γ̂ applies, then r(γ̃iz(A)|ht) = zz1+zz and r(γ̃iz({a})|h
t) =
1
(1+zz)|A| for all a ∈ A.
3. If r(γ̃i(Mi)|ht−1) = 1 for some i and Mi, then r(γ̃i(Mi)|ht) = 1.
In words, suppose that the agents face mechanism γ̂ in period t−1. Depending
on the agents’ messages in that period, period t mechanism is determined as
follows. If their reports are unanimous or there is a single agent i∗ who sends
a message mi∗ = (θ
′, b′, v′, z′) different from (θ, b, v, z), which is sent by all the
other agents, and (b′, v′) ̸∈ Ci∗(θ), then the mechanism γ̂ is again selected in
period t. If instead the message of agent i∗ is such that (b′, v′) ∈ Ci∗(θ), then
the demanded alternative b′ is implemented and from the next period on either
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agent i∗ or i∗ + 1 is given the right to choose alternatives from set A (in case
of i∗) or Ai∗ (in case of i
∗ + 1) forever, or one of the constant mechanisms is
applied forever. The probabilities of these scenarios are chosen so as to ensure
that agent i∗ expects his announced continuation payoff v′i∗ , assuming that, on
one hand, agent i∗ + 1 will always choose agent i∗’s worst alternative from Ai∗ if
agent i∗ + 1 becomes a dictator and, on the other hand, agent i∗ plays optimally
if he becomes the dictator. Finally, for all other message profiles, either the agent
with the highest announced integer is given the right to choose alternatives from
A (with probability zz/(1 + zz)) or one of the constant mechanisms is applied
forever (with probability 1/(|A|(1 + zz))).25
We now prove that the defined regime implements f . Lemma 5 establishes
that there exists an equilibrium that selects the desirable alternative in each
period, while Lemma 6 establishes that in any equilibrium, only the desirable
alternative is selected in each period.
Lemma 5. There exists a Nash equilibrium s such that g(s(ht, θt, γt)) = f(θt)
for all t ∈ T , θt ∈ Θ, ht ∈ H t, and γt ∈ Γ such that q(ht|s, r)r(γt|ht) > 0.
Proof. Let i∗ be the agent that is defined in part (2b) of r. Also, let j = i∗ + 1.
For all t, θt, and ht, let s be defined as follows:
1. si(h





t, γ̃i∗ , θ






t) = ∅ for all i ̸= j.
Note that we have left s unspecified when multilateral deviations occur.
Given s, the payoff of agent i in period t when the state of the world is θ
is (1 − δ)ui(f(θ), θ) + δvfi . Suppose period t is the first period in which agent
i deviates from si. The only period t deviations that matter are the ones that
fall under Part (IIa) of γ̂. However, for any such deviation, (b, v) ∈ Ci(θ) and i’s
payoff is (1−δ)ui(b, θ)+δvi, which is weakly smaller than (1−δ)ui(f(θ), θ)+δvfi .
Note that vi is, indeed, the highest continuation payoff that agent i can expect
given the strategy of agent j if the mechanism γ̃j(Ai∗) is selected in period t +
1.
Lemma 6. In any Nash equilibrium s of r, g(s(ht, θt, γt)) = f(θt) for all t ∈ T ,
θt ∈ Θ, ht ∈ H t, and γt ∈ Γ such that q(ht|s, r)r(γt|ht) > 0.
25We could also design a regime without the unbounded (or open) “integer game” in part (III)
of γ̂ by instead allowing the agents to announce numbers from the compact [0, 1] interval. For
example, the agent who announces the largest number becomes a dictator with the probability
equal to his number if this number is strictly less than 1, and with the remaining probability the
constant mechanisms are played. If anyone announces 1, then a constant mechanism is selected
with equal probabilities. Hence, the regime (resp., mechanism) is discontinuous in strategies
(resp., messages).
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If (Ci(θ))i,θ can be chosen such that for all i ∈ I, θ ∈ Θ, and (b, v) ∈ Ci(θ), it
is true that vi ̸∈ {vi, vi}, then the only possible Nash equilibria are the ones that
fall under Claim 1 below.
Proof. Fix some Nash equilibrium s.
Claim 1. [Full deception] If for all t, θt, ht such that q(ht|s, r)r(γ̂|ht) > 0,
si(h
t, θt, γ̂) = (θ, b, v, z) for all i, then g(s(ht, θt, γ̂)) = f(θ) = f(θt). Similarly, if
there exist t, θt, ht such that q(ht|s, r)r(γ̂|ht) > 0, si(ht, θt, γ̂) = (θ, b, v, z) for all
i ̸= i∗ and si∗(ht, θt, γ̂) = (·, b′, v′, ·) ̸= (θ, b, v, z) such that (b′, v′) ̸∈ Ci∗(θ) (that
is, part (IIb) of γ̂ and part (2a) of r apply), then g(s(ht, θt, γ̂)) = f(θ) = f(θt).
Proof of Claim 1. This follows directly from dynamic monotonicity, as in the
proof of Claim 3 in Theorem 2 of Mezzetti and Renou (2014).
Claim 2. [An odd-man-out] If there exist t, θt, ht such that q(ht|s, r)r(γ̂|ht) > 0,
si(h
t, θt, γ̂) = (θ, b, v, z) for all i ̸= i∗ and si∗(ht, θt, γ̂) = (·, b′, v′, ·) ̸= (θ, b, v, z)
such that (b′, v′) ∈ Ci∗(θ) (that is, part (IIa) of γ̂ and part (2b) of r apply), then
g(s(ht, θt, γ̂)) = b′ = f(θt).
Proof of Claim 2. Cases 2(b)i and 2(b)ii of r: This cannot be an equilibrium
because there is a positive probability that one of the constant mechanisms is
played forever. Hence, due to strict preferences26, there is an agent j ̸= i who
prefers to play the integer game and to announce high enough integer to decrease
the probability with which the constant mechanisms are played.
Case 2(b)iii of r: This can only be an equilibrium if the hypothesis (i.e., if -
part) in Condition λ1 applies. But then, by the conclusion (i.e., then-part) of
Condition λ1, f(θt) = b′ as required. If the hypothesis of Condition λ1 does not
apply, there is an agent j ̸= i, who wants to deviate and trigger the integer game
with a sufficiently high integer, which allows him to get a payoff arbitrarily close
to his best payoff.
Case 2(b)iv of r: This can only be an equilibrium if the hypothesis in Con-
dition λ0 applies. But then, by the conclusion of Condition λ0, f(θt) = b′ as
required. If the hypothesis of Condition λ0 does not apply, there is an agent
j ̸= i, who wants to deviate and trigger the integer game with a sufficiently high
integer, which allows him to get a payoff arbitrarily close to his best payoff.
26 In the case of weak preferences, we have to suppose that there are two agents who are not
always indifferent between all alternatives. Otherwise, if there are n− 1 agents who are always
indifferent between all alternatives, it is as if the designer only faced a single agent - the one
who is not indifferent. Then, according to dynamic monotonicity, f must give this agent his
unique best alternative in the range of f in each state. Such f can be implemented by simply
making this agent the dictator over the range of f . If all agents are indifferent between all
alternatives in all states, then dynamic monotonicity is not satisfied and the implementation
of f is hopeless.
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Claim 3. [Integer game] There is no equilibrium s such that q(ht|s, r)r(γ̂|ht) > 0
for some t, θt, ht but neither the hypothesis of Claim 1 nor Claim 2 applies.
Proof of Claim 3. It is trivially true because agents want to announce higher and
higher integers to decrease the probability of the constant mechanisms. (Footnote
26 again applies for weak preferences.)
Claim 4. g(s(ht, θt, γ̃i(Mi))) = f(θt) for all t, θt, i, Mi ∈ A ∪ {A} ∪ {Ai−1},
and ht such that q(ht|s, r)r(γ̃i(Mi)|ht) > 0.
Proof of Claim 4. From the proofs of Claims 2 and 3, we know that there can
only be an equilibrium s in which a mechanism γ̃i(Mi) is played, if either Con-
dition λ0 or λ1 applies. If that happens, then it follows immediately from ei-
ther condition that g(s(ht, θt, γ̃i(Mi))) = f(θt) for all t, θt, and ht such that
q(ht|s, r)r(γ̃i(Mi)|ht) > 0.
B Proofs for the Two Agent Case
B.1 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that vfi = vi for some i ∈ {1, 2}. Then, we can implement f by making
agent i a dictator over A. (Note that we continue to assume that the preferences
are strict.) Hence, we assume that vfi < vi for i = 1, 2. Also, it cannot be that
vfi = vi for some i ∈ {1, 2} because f is efficient and v
f
j < vj for j ̸= i. (If
vfi = vi, then, for example, aj(·) would give higher payoffs to both agents than
f .) Hence, we can assume that vi > v
f
i > vi for i = 1, 2.
Let us fix C = (Ci(θ))i,θ such that f is Maskin monotonic* with respect to C
and f satisfies self-selection* relative to C. Also, let b(θ1, θ2) for all (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ2
be the alternatives that are defined in Definition 6. We argue that we can always
pick another collection C ′ such that f is Maskin monotonic* w.r.t. C ′, f satisfies
self-selection* relative to C ′, and Conditions λ0 and λ1 are vacuously satisfied
as we have done when proving Corollary 1. There are two differences, however.
First, we need additionally to ensure that part 2 in Definition 6 continues to hold.
Second, unlike dynamic monotonicity, in the case of Maskin monotonicity*, we
only have to take care of finitely many strict inequalities when modifying the
collection C.
Thus, suppose we want to replace (ã, v) ∈ C1(θ2) for some θ2 ∈ Θ with another
alternative and continuation payoff pair (b̃, w). To preserve Maskin monotonic-
ity*, we need to ensure that for any θ, if the following inequalities hold
(1− δ)u1(f(θ2), θ2) + δvf1 ≥ (1− δ)u1(ã, θ2) + δv1, (1)
(1− δ)u1(f(θ2), θ) + δvf1 < (1− δ)u1(ã, θ) + δv1, (2)
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then they continue to hold once we replace (ã, v) with (b̃, w). Additionally, to
satisfy part 2 in Definition 6, it is enough to ensure that for any pair (θ, θ′), if
the following inequality holds
(1− δ)u1(b(θ′, θ2), θ) + δvf1 < (1− δ)u1(ã, θ) + δv1 (3)
then it continues to hold once we replace (ã, v) with (b̃, w).
Suppose that (ã, v) is such that v1 = v1. Then, because of strict inequalities
in (2) and (3), we can always set b̃ = ã and pick w such that w1 is slightly below
v1. Suppose now that (ã, v) is such that v1 = v1. If the inequality in (1) is strict,
we can again set b̃ = ã and pick w such that w1 is slightly above v1. If (1) holds
with equality, it must be that u1(ã, θ2) > u1(f(θ2), θ2). Then, again because of
strict inequalities in (2) and (3), we can choose b̃ to be a convex combination of ã
and f(θ2) (with sufficiently high weight on ã) and pick w such that w1 is slightly
above v1. We can repeat this process for all θ2 and all (ã, v) ∈ C1(θ2) such that
either v1 = v1 or v1 = v1 holds. The same can be done for agent 2. In this way,
we have constructed a collection C ′ such that f is Maskin monotonic* w.r.t. C ′,
f satisfies self-selection* relative to C ′, and Conditions λ0 and λ1 are vacuously
satisfied. By abusing notation, let C ′ = C in the continuation.
Consider the following mechanism and regime, which is well defined since
agent i ∈ {1, 2} cannot demand either vi or vi.
Mechanism γ̌. Let Mi = {Θ× A× V × Z+}. Let g be as follows:
I. If m1 = m2 = (θ, a, v, 0), then g(m) = f(θ).
II. If m1 = (θ, a, v, 0) and m2 = (θ
′, a′, v′, 0) ̸= m1, then g(m) = b(θ, θ′).
III. If mi = (θ, a, v, z) with z > 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2} and mj = (θ′, a′, v′, 0) for
j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, then
(a) g(m) = a if (a, v) ∈ Ci(θ′).
(b) g(m) = f(θ′) otherwise.
IV. If m1 = (θ, a, v, z) with z > 0 and m2 = (θ
′, a′, v′, z′) ̸= m1 with z′ > 0,
then
(a) g(m) = a if z ≥ z′.
(b) g(m) = a′ otherwise.
Regime ř.
1. ř(γ̌|h0) = 1.
2. For t ≥ 1 if ř(γ̌|ht−1) = 1 and mt−1 = (m1,m2) is such that
(a) Part (I), (II) or (IIIb) of γ̌ applies, then ř(γ̌|ht) = 1.
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(b) Part (IIIa) of γ̌ applies, then
i. If vi < vi ≤ v̂i, then
ř(γ̃i({a})|ht) = λ/|A| for all a ∈ A,






ii. If v̂i < vi < vi, then
ř(γ̃i(A)|ht) = λ,






(c) Part (IVa) of γ̌ applies, then ř(γ̃1(A)|ht) = z1+z and ř(γ̃1({a})|h
t) =
1
(1+z)|A| for all a ∈ A.





(1+z′)|A| for all a ∈ A.
3. If ř(γ̃i(Mi)|ht−1) = 1 for some i and Mi, then ř(γ̃i(Mi)|ht) = 1.
There can be no equilibrium in which messages that fall under Parts (III) or
(IV) of γ̌ are sent with a positive probability because the agents would compete
to become the dictator. Consider now any equilibrium. Period 0 messages in that
equilibrium must take the form of m1 = (θ1, ·, ·, 0) and m2 = (θ2, ·, ·, 0). Suppose
in particular that the state in period 0 is θ∗ and the agents send the messagesm1 =
(θ1, ·, ·, 0) and m2 = (θ2, ·, ·, 0) ̸= m1. Then, alternative b(θ1, θ2) is implemented
in period 0. Further, each agent i can guarantee a continuation payoff of vfi by
instead announcingm′i = (θi, b(θ1, θ2), v
f , 1). Therefore, by efficiency of f , it must
be that their equilibrium continuation payoffs at the start of period 1 are vf . Now,
suppose instead that in the equilibrium, the agents send m1 = m2 = (θ, ·, ·, 0)
in period 0 when the state is θ∗. Then, alternative f(θ) is implemented in that
period. Again, each agent i can guarantee a continuation payoff of vfi by instead
announcing m′i = (θ, f(θ), v
f , 1). Therefore, again by efficiency of f , it must be
that their equilibrium continuation payoffs at the start of period 1 are vf .
Finally, if nobody has incentives to deviate in state θ∗ in period 0, it must
be that (b(θ1, θ2), v
f ) ∈ M1(C1(θ2), θ∗) ∩ M2(C2(θ1), θ∗) and, by self-selection*,
b(θ1, θ2) = f(θ
∗) when the messages are m1 = (θ1, ·, ·, 0) and m2 = (θ2, ·, ·, 0) ̸=
m1. Or, (f(θ), v
f ) ∈ M1(C1(θ), θ∗)∩M2(C2(θ), θ∗) and, by Maskin monotonicity*,
f(θ) = f(θ∗) when the messages are m1 = m2 = (θ, ·, ·, 0).
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Hence, we have established that in any equilibrium, f(θ∗) is implemented for
any θ∗ in period 0. The same argument can be repeated for all periods t > 0. This
establishes that there are no undesirable equilibria. To prove that there exists a
desirable equilibrium, we can use the result of Lemma 5 where we replace γ̂ with
γ̌.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove Proposition 5, we have to modify slightly the regime described in the
previous subsection. In particular, when both agents disagree by sending mes-
sages of the form m1 = (θ1, ·, ·, 0) and m2 = (θ2, ·, ·, 0) ̸= m1 (i.e., Part (II) of γ̌
applies), we now assume that the bad outcome b̃ is implemented from that point
on forever. Also, instead of modifying the collection C as it was done in the proof
of Proposition 4, we can directly invoke Corollary 1 to conclude that there exists
a collection C with respect to which f is dynamically monotonic and relative to
which f satisfies Conditions λ0 and λ1 vacuously since no agent i ∈ {1, 2} can
demand either vi or vi. Further, because of the bad outcome assumption, it is
true that vfi ̸= vi and we can also assume that v
f
i ̸= vi because otherwise f can
be implemented by making agent i the dictator. Therefore, we can also include
(f(θ), vf ) in Ci(θ) for all i and θ without violating Conditions λ0 and λ1.
Given these changes, we can now prove that ř implements f . As before, there
can be no equilibrium in which messages that fall under Parts (III) or (IV) of γ̌
are sent with a positive probability. Also, there cannot be an equilibrium in which
messages that fall under Part (II) of γ̌ are sent with a positive probability: given
that agent j reports θ, agent i ̸= j can opt for (f(θ), vf ), which is clearly better
than getting the bad outcome forever. Hence, in any equilibrium, the messages
must fall under Part (I) of γ̌ but then dynamic monotonicity ensures that the
desired alternative is implemented in each period.
C Examples
Example 1
The purpose of this example is to illustrate how the introduction of threat in
the regime to randomly implement a constant alternative forever in the case of
disagreement can help to implement a social choice function. There are three
agents, 1, 2, 3, five alternatives a, b, c, d, e, and two states of the world, θ′ and
θ′′, each occurring with equal probability. The discount factor is assumed to be
δ = 1
3




A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3
a 2 3 3 1 1 1
b 0 3 3 1/2 3 3
c 3 3 3 4/3 3 3
d 1 1 1 1/2 0 0
e 1 3 3 0 3 3
Let the social choice function be f(θ′) = d and f(θ′′) = a. Note that this
function does not satisfy no-veto power, does not satisfy Assumptions A(i) (as
we show later) and A(ii) of Mezzetti and Renou (2014), and it is not even weakly
efficient in the range. It is also true that there is no θ and two agents i, j such that
the intersection of the best alternatives of agents i and j at state θ is empty, i.e.,
Assumption A in Lee and Sabourian (2011) does not hold because c is the best
alternative for all agents in both states. Therefore, we cannot apply Theorem 2 of
Mezzetti and Renou (2014) even if f is dynamically monotonic or Theorem 2 of
Lee and Sabourian (2011). Condition ω of Lee and Sabourian (2011), however, is
satisfied: always implementing alternative d gives on average less to each player
than vf , that is,
∑
θ p(θ)ui(d, θ) < v
f
i for all i. This assumption, however, is not
necessary for our construction.
We verify that f is indeed dynamically monotonic. Note that vf = (1, 1, 1).
The only deception that we need to take care of is a stationary one that is obtained
by applying a static deception π0(θ′) = θ′′ and π0(θ′′) = θ′′ in each period since it
results in the highest payoffs vf (π0) = (3
2
, 2, 2). If we can eliminate this deception,
then we can also eliminate any non-stationary deception, where at state θ′, the
agents sometimes pretend that the state is θ′′ and sometimes report truthfully
that the state is θ′, since such a deception would result in lower payoffs.27 Suppose
that C1(θ
′′) contains an element (c, v) such that v1 ≤ 13 . We verify that it gives
incentives for agent 1 to destroy the deception. For that we need to verify that
the following inequalities are satisfied:
(1− δ)u1(c, θ′′) + δv1 ≤ (1− δ)u1(a, θ′′) + δvf1 ,
(1− δ)u1(c, θ′) + δv1 > (1− δ)u1(a, θ′) + δvf1 (π0).
That is, the first equation ensures that (c, v) ∈ L1((f(θ′′), vf ), θ′′) and the truth-
telling equilibrium is not eliminated, while the second equation ensures that
(c, v) ̸∈ L1((f(θ′′), vf ), θ′) and the undesirable equilibrium is eliminated. After














27The agents have no incentives to ever pretend in state θ′′ that the state is θ′.
36
Thus, they are indeed satisfied for v1 ≤ 13 .
If we apply the regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014), then agent 1 becomes
a dictator with the probability of λ =
v1−v1
v1−v1




from the next period onwards after he has announced (c, v), while the other
agents have announced that the state is θ′′. With the remaining probability of
1 − λ, agent 2 becomes the dictator.28 However, this regime has an unwanted
equilibrium, in which in state θ′, agent 1 announces (c, v), while the other agents
announce that the state is θ′′, and then, in the continuation, the dictator chooses
alternative c forever. Since c is the best alternative for all agents in both states,
nobody has incentives to deviate.29
We can eliminate this unwanted equilibrium by modifying the regime as fol-
lows. After agent 1 announces (c, v), instead of allowing agent 1 to become the
dictator, the regime now chooses each of the five alternatives forever with equal
probability of λ/5. With the remaining probability of 1 − λ, agent 2 still be-




where v̂1 is the continuation payoff of agent 1 when one of the alterna-
tives is selected uniformly (v̂1 =
31
30
in the example; hence, v̂1 > v1 holds). With
this modification in the regime, the undesirable equilibrium is eliminated because
agents 2 and 3 have incentives to trigger the integer game. Further, to ensure
that the integer game does not have undesirable equilibria, we require that while
the agents can reduce the probability of having a constant alternative forever by
announcing higher and higher integers, this probability cannot be made equal to
0.
Example 2
The purpose of this example is to demonstrate the necessity of Condition λ0. It
also illustrates how the use of doubly-stochastic regimes helps to satisfy this con-
dition when simply-stochastic regimes fail. A similar example can be constructed
for Condition λ1.
Consider a modification of the previous example. The only change is in the
payoffs of the agents when alternative c is selected in state θ′′ (see the table
below). Everything else remains the same as in the previous example.
28In fact, Mezzetti and Renou (2014) assume that with probability 1 − λ, the outcome is
decided by qualified majority, but this difference in the regime does not matter for the argument.
29This proves that Assumption A(i) of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) is not satisfied. It also
means that there is an undesirable equilibrium, in which the agents trigger the integer game.
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θ′ θ′′
A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A3
a 2 3 3 1 1 1
b 0 3 3 1/2 3 3
c 3 3 3 3/2 2 2
d 1 1 1 1/2 0 0
e 1 3 3 0 3 3
We again verify that f is dynamically monotonic. However, we want to show
that the only possible way to destroy the repeated use of static deception π0(θ′) =
θ′′ and π0(θ′′) = θ′′ in each period is for agent 1 to announce (c, (0, 3, 3)). For
that we consider each possible deviation by each agent. The deception will be
destroyed if the following inequalities will hold for some agent i and some pair
(x, v):
(1− δ)ui(x, θ′′) + δvi ≤ (1− δ)ui(a, θ′′) + δvfi ,
(1− δ)ui(x, θ′) + δvi > (1− δ)u1(a, θ′) + δvfi (π0).


















The above inequalities require that
• If x = a, then v1 ≤ 1 and v1 > 32 , which is impossible.
• If x = b, then v1 ≤ 2 and v1 > 112 , which is impossible.
• If x = c, then v1 ≤ 0 and v1 > −12 . Since v1 = 0, it follows that (c, (0, 3, 3))
is the unique alternative-continuation payoff pair that agent 1 can announce
to destroy the deception.
• If x = d, then v1 ≤ 2 and v1 > 72 , which is impossible.
• If x = e, then v1 ≤ 3 and v1 > 72 , which is impossible.


















The above inequalities require that
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• If x = a, then v2 ≤ 1 and v2 > 2, which is impossible.
• If x = b, then v2 ≤ −3 and v2 > 2, which is impossible.
• If x = c, then v2 ≤ −1 and v2 > 2, which is impossible.
• If x = d, then v2 ≤ 3 and v2 > 6, which is impossible.
• If x = e, then v2 ≤ −3 and v2 > 2, which is impossible.
We conclude that f is dynamically monotonic but the only way to destroy the
deception, given by π0(θ′) = θ′′ and π0(θ′′) = θ′′ in each period, is for agent 1 to
announce (c, (0, 3, 3)).
Even though f is dynamically monotonic, it is not repeatedly implementable
using a simply-stochastic regime. Since C1(θ
′′) necessarily contains (c, (0, 3, 3)),
and the premiss of Condition λ0 is satisfied while its implication not (f(θ′) ̸= c),
our Theorem 1 tells us that f is not repeatedly implementable with simply-
stochastic regimes. Note that our simply-stochastic regime, which fails in this
case, and the regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) are the same now since agent
1 becomes dictator with probability 0 and, therefore, we cannot introduce con-
stant alternatives with positive probabilities. Therefore, f is also not repeatedly
implementable by the regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014).
To see why f is not implementable, consider a strategy profile in which in state
θ′, agent 1 announces (c, (0, 3, 3)), while agents 2 and 3 report that it is state θ′′.
In the continuation, agent 2 selects alternative b in state θ′ and alternative e
in state θ′′. If agent 1 does not announce (c, (0, 3, 3)) in state θ′, then agents 2
and 3 report the state honestly in all future periods. Then, if agent 1 announces

























Therefore, agent 1 does not want to deviate from the specified strategy. Since
agents 2 and 3 receive their best alternatives, they also do not want to deviate.
Hence, we have a Nash equilibrium, in which an undesirable alternative is imple-
mented. The same argument can be obtained for any regime, which does not use
stochastic stage mechanisms.
However, we can repeatedly implement f using a doubly-stochastic regime.
With the help of lottery, we can replace the alternative-continuation payoff pair
(c, (0, 3, 3)) with another pair that gives lower current period payoff in period θ′
to agent 1 while we increase his continuation payoff. For example, agent 1 can
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are satisfied for 1
6
< v1 ≤ 13 . Since v1 > 0, we can again introduce the threat of
having constant alternatives with a positive probability in the case of disagree-
ment.
Example 3
We illustrate how to construct the stage game payoffs of the repeated game in
Section 4.1. For that, we use the setup of Example 1. For simplicity, we only
present the payoffs for the case when players 2 and 3 choose the same action.
One can choose C1(θ
′) = {(d, (1, 1, 1)), (b, (13
6







































































































The stage game payoffs when players 2 and 3 choose the same action are given in
the following matrices, where we have set ui(x, θ
∗) = −5 for θ∗ = θ′, θ′′ if x falls
under point 4 in Section 4.1.
Player 1
Players 2 and 3
u(x, θ′) θ′ θ′′ ω o
θ′ 1, 1, 1 −5,−5,−5 −5,−5,−5 −5, 0, 0






o 0,−5,−5 0,−5,−5 0− 5,−5 0, 0, 0
Player 1
Players 2 and 3
u(x, θ′′) θ′ θ′′ ω o
θ′ 1
2
, 0, 0 −5,−5,−5 −5,−5,−5 −5, 0, 0






o 0,−5,−5 0,−5,−5 0− 5,−5 0, 0, 0
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Example 4
This example illustrates that the regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) can fail
to implement a utilitarian social choice function.
There are two states of the world, θ and θ′ that occur with equal probabilities.
There are three agents. The preferences of agent 1 in the two states are given by
u1(a, θ) = 1− (a− 14)
2 and u1(a, θ




)2, respectively. The preferences
of agents 2 and 3 are identical and are given by u2(a, θ) = u3(a, θ) = 5−5(a−α)2
and u2(a, θ
′) = u3(a, θ
′) = 5− 6(a− 3
10









The discount factor is δ = 1
2
.








. Hence, fu does not satisfy no-
veto power. Further, vf
u













)2 ≈ 0.7921 and











. The indifference curve of agent 1 that
passes through the point (fu(θ), vf
u
1 ) in state θ is given by pairs (a, v1) that satisfy
the following equation:
u1(f
u(θ), θ) + vf
u
1 = u1(a, θ) + v1. (4)
Additionally, v1 ≥ v1 must hold. One can verify that (4) is satisfied for v1 = v1
when a = 1
5
and a = 3
10
. Since v1 < v1 for a ∈ (15 ,
3
10
), it follows that no (a, v)








We argue that the regime of Mezzetti and Renou (2014) possesses an unde-
sirable equilibrium because they allow an agent to demand anything in A once
he becomes a dictator. Thus, let Ci(θ) = Li((f
u(θ), vf
u
), θ) for all i and θ as it
is the case in Mezzetti and Renou (2014). Suppose that in state θ′, agents 2 and
3 send identical messages that claim that the state is θ, while agent 1 sends a
different message. We look for (a, v) ∈ M1(L1((fu(θ), vf
u
), θ), θ′). It is equivalent
to finding (a, v) that maximizes the payoff of agent 1, (1−δ)u1(a, θ′)+δv1 subject




). (For any (a, v) that does not satisfy
(4), we can find another v′ such that agent 1 receives a strictly higher continua-
tion payoff and (a, v′) ∈ L1((fu(θ), vf
u
), θ).) Substituting for v1 from (4) into the
objective function and noting that δ = 1
2















is maximized for (a, v1) = (
3
10
, v1). Since v1 = v1, agent 2 becomes a dictator
with probability 1 from the next period onwards. He will choose a = α whenever
the state is θ and a = 1
3
whenever the state is θ′. Clearly, no agent has incentives
to deviate. Therefore, we have an equilibrium, which does not implement fu.
But, of course, fu is implementable using our doubly-stochastic regime as noted
after the proof of Proposition 3.
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